

How To React To Right-Wing Populist Challengers? Lessons From UK Mainstream Parties

*Sergei Shein

Abstract

This article investigates how and why the European mainstream responds to the challenge of right-wing populist parties (RWPP), by analyzing the UK case. Using a mixed methodological approach, which includes the theoretical tools of historical institutionalism, classifications of mainstream parties strategies, and Heinze's approach to analyzing the factors of strategy choice, we survey the strategic responses of the UK political mainstream (Conservatives and Labour), towards RWPP (UK Independence Party). Findings suggest that the political mainstream could move from exclusion strategies, to predominantly inclusion strategies. In the UK case, accommodation of UKIP's policy positions with political and legal isolation. Transiting to these strategies takes place under the influence of the electoral and ideological development of UKIP, the salience of migration issues, strategies of other mainstream parties and the historical conditions that define the available options and shape the selection process, in the UK – party-based Euroscepticism.

Keywords: European mainstream parties, right-wing populism, political strategies, Euroscepticism, UK

Introduction

Right-wing populist parties (RWPP) have become the most successful new party family in Europe over the last quarter of a century (Painter, 2013: 9), and have changed the contemporary European political landscape. An ideational approach to defining right-wing populism (RWP), which is dominant among scholars of political parties (March, 2017: 284), means that RWP is a 'thin-centred' ideology 'that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite" (Mudde, 2004: 543), which uses nationalism (Rydgren, 2007), or in a narrow sense, nativism (Mudde, 2007; Guia, 2016) to defend the "pure people" and their "heartland" (Taggart, 2000). Numerous studies show that the conceptual core of right-wing populism includes antisystem characteristics: anti-elitism (Mudde, 2014; Greven, 2016), Euroscepticism (Pirro et al., 2018; Vasilopoulou, 2018; Kneuer, 2018; Szöcsik and Polyakova, 2018), and anti-pluralism (Woodak et al., 2013; Miller, 2016; Painter, 2013; Taggart, 2012). This threatens

the mainstream parties' electoral positions and creates tensions in the development of the European integration as an elite project (Best et. al., 2012) and institutions and principles of European democracy. In this situation, academic debate about the political mainstream's responses to the new challengers is relevant.

A theoretical understanding of how mainstream political actors respond to the challenge of niche, extremist or right-wing populist parties (Downs, 2001, 2012; Meguid, 2008; Bale et al., 2010; Goodwin, 2011; Heinze, 2018), the effects of certain strategic responses for political systems (Bale, 2003; Art, 2007; De Lange, 2012) and their effectiveness (Fallend and Heinisch, 2016; Carvalho, 2017) are characterised by differences in theoretical approaches and empirical cases. The common feature of these studies is their predominant focus on the parties as the main actors in the selection and realisation of strategies to counter the new challenge. Scholars take into account the differences in the political strategies of centre-right and centre-left parties, which are based not only on the electoral positions of RWPP and their ideological differences (Heinze, 2018; Bale et al., 2003, 2010), but on the principle “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. This means a mainstream party may increase a niche party’s success if it decreases the support of another mainstream party (Meguid, 2008). Finally, the EU, immigration control and integration issues, which right-wing populists are pushing into the political agenda, have become a focus for researchers. However, contemporary European politics raises questions about the more complex and flexible character of mainstream strategies, and their changes over time. There is no clear explanation of which factors influence mainstream parties’ strategies selection in different national contexts.

This article tries to extend an answer to the questions *how* and *why* the European political mainstream responds to the challenge of RWP, with a UK case study. The UK is a specific case of the interaction between the mainstream and RWP, characterized by its unique political conditions and features: (1) the UK’s majoritarian democracy (the Westminster system), which perhaps protects the mainstream to a greater extent than elsewhere (Painter, 2013: 51); (2) a strong and stable political tradition of Euroscepticism, which has become part of mainstream politics (Bale, 2013; Watts and Bale, 2018) and shaped competition among parties. Accordingly, the main questions are: what strategies does the UK political mainstream choose and implement in response to the UK Independence Party (UKIP)? What factors influence the transition from one type of strategy to another, and does history matter in this process?

Using existing approaches to the conceptualisation of the political strategies to define the content of the UK mainstream's strategies, and Heinze's approach (2018) to explain the factors of their choice, we take into account that the interaction between the mainstream and RWP, does not occur outside of time and space, but depends on historical conditions. Historical institutionalism (HI) is a theoretical approach used in research about political part development, competition, and adaptation over time (Galvin, 2016). Instruments of HI allow the analysis of strategies of the UK mainstream, taking into account their dynamics and continuity, with particular attention to the cause and effect relationships in their development.

This paper is divided into two parts. The first deals with existing approaches to the analysis and classification of the political strategies of the European mainstream to new political challenges. The second conceptualizes the strategies of the UK political mainstream towards RWPP and the factors that underlie their choice.

Mainstream parties' strategies towards RWPP: attempts to theorize

In the most general sense, mainstream parties can engage and disengage (Downs, 2001:26), include or exclude (Goodwin, 2011:23) RWPP, but a more specific and detailed understanding of their strategies is needed to reveal the general approaches used in the academic literature.

The *parties' policy position approach* (Bale et al., 2010; see also Goodwin, 2011) is based on the dynamics of the mainstream parties' policy positions in the electoral struggle with RWPP. By analysing the changing positions of mainstream parties on immigration issues in Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, and Austria within the context of the growing influence of RWPP, scholars have proposed three ideal types of the mainstream parties' strategies: *hold* – maintaining the party's position on the problem; *defuse* – decreasing the salience of a new political issue in the political debate and attempt to shift public attention to something else; *adapt* – take the RWPP's policy position to maximize votes (Bale et al., 2010). Following this approach, the mainstream parties (in this case the centre-left) under electoral pressure from RWPP and a prospective centre-right coalition (Bale, 2003) choose a concrete type of strategy defined by the political context, which includes the strategies of the centre-right and far left parties and the internal unity of the centre-left parties.

The findings of this approach highlight the mutual influence of party strategies and the intersection of internal and external factors in strategy choice. This approach also introduces the category of timing in the process of strategy selection, by confirming that sooner or later

the centre-left parties (except Labour Party in Norway) made a shift from a *hold* to *adapt* the RWPP position. At the centre of this approach is the flexibility of a party's policy position, but mainstream parties, especially in government, have the ability to increase or decrease issue salience for the public, this ability shapes the available strategy choices and defines the effectiveness of the strategy. Historical issue-ownership on immigration (not typical for social-democrats) also affects the strategic responses of the mainstream and makes it easier for centre-right parties than for the centre-left to realise inclusion strategies towards RWPP.

One major drawback of this approach is that it takes into account only the electoral dimension of the political struggle between the mainstream and RWP. It is not entirely clear how mainstream parties move from the exclusion to the inclusion of RWPP policies in different institutional settings. In the cases mentioned, the institutional environment includes proportionality based electoral systems that are more favourable for RWPP than, for example, the electoral systems in UK or France. Historical legacy, in particular the experience of the relationships of the political mainstream and the extreme right, affects mainstream strategy choice differently: consider for example the marginalization of far-right Republicans in post-war Germany and the mainstream's coalition experience with the Austrian Freedom Party in post-war Austria.

At the heart of another approach (Downs, 2001, 2012; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; see also Cappocia, 2001), which we can call the *countering extremism approach*, is the understanding that the strategic answers of democratic actors are not just about restoring their electoral positions, but about countering party-based extremism, which threatens the principles and norms of European democracy. Downs, based on an analysis of empirical material from European countries, proposed five types of mainstream party strategies toward “pariah” parties: *ignoring*, *political or legal isolation*, *co-optation*, and *collaboration* (2001: 24–28). Mudde and Kaltwasser, analysing different cases from Latin America to Europe, suggested a similar classification: *isolation*, *confrontation*, *adaptation*, and *socialization* (2012: 213-214), but these strategies are a byproduct of these authors’ comparative case study about the relationship between democracy and populism, so they are less developed than Downs' classification.

Table 1. Downs' classification of mainstream strategies

Strategy	Type	Meaning
Ignoring	Exclusive	Delegitimizing opponents and their policy positions
Political isolation	Exclusive	Formation of a “sanitary cordon”, around RWPP in parliament and beyond
Legal isolation	Exclusive	Outlawing the party completely, raising thresholds for representation in electoral laws, and restricting voice
Co-optation	Inclusive	Adapting the RWPP's policy positions directly or indirectly
Collaboration	Inclusive	Engaging RWPP in cooperation

Downs' classification shows that exclusion strategies require a high level of coordination. A failure in the “sanitary cordon” strategy may result in mainstream parties, especially centre-right parties (Szöcsik and Polyakova, 2018), being tempted to defect from the centre in order to regain the votes that they are losing to extremists (Capoccia, 2001: 438).

Regarding the choice of a specific strategy, this approach only outlined the importance of coordination among mainstream parties' strategies, which can be developed, for example, by emphasizing that differences in the mainstream parties' ideological stance, manifest in inclusive rather than exclusive strategies. It is more likely for centre-right parties to move from the exclusion strategy to co-optation, based on the ideological and programmatic proximity between the centre-right and RWPP. This is evident in the interaction between the Conservative Party and UKIP, which has been characterised by scholars as “symbiotic” (Bale, 2018), or a “multifaceted connection”, based on “similar issue positions, a common discourse and, in particular, a shared history” (Alexandre-Collier, 2018: 205). In some cases, centre-right parties can be closer to the right flank than RWPP. A clear example of this is the election manifesto of Bavarian CSU in 2013 which was more right-leaning AfD's

(Arzheimer, 2015: 544). It is also easier for the centre-right party enter in coalition with RWPP, to deradicalize its program and stimulate intra-party division as Austrian case showed (de Lange, 2012).

In this approach, the selection of a specific strategy can be influenced by different factors at the individual level (motivations of politicians, e.g. office maximization), the party level (fragmentation of the party system, e.g. strategies of other parties) and the system level (electoral rules, e.g. the timing and proportionality of elections) (Downs 2001: 28–9). Downs also noted that historical context arguably provides an environment that defines and constrains strategic imperatives and alternatives for democratic actors in situation of choice (Downs, 2012, 54).

To sum up, the *democracy defending approach* to a greater extent than the *policy position approach* takes into account the multidimensional character of mainstream strategies, which are not limited to the electoral arena. Especially when a mainstream party comes to power, a set of instruments of legal isolation or the possibility to collaborate with the “pariah” on different levels of political system appears.

Finally, the *issue- and non-issue-based approach* (Meguid, 2008) answers the question of how mainstream parties’ strategies influence niche party success in different national contexts. Meguid defined facets of party strategies: issue-ownership, issue-salience and issue-position, and identifies three types of strategies: *dismissive*, *accommodative*, and *adversarial* (Tab. 2). She focused on how the combination of strategies of the mainstream parties affects the electoral success of a niche party. From the point of view of our investigation, it is important that the imbalance between mainstream and niche party resources allows mainstream parties to use institutional (electoral restrictions) and organizational tools (co-opting niche party elites and members) as *non-issue-based* elements of strategies. In this case, we move beyond a fairly clear separation between exclusionary and inclusive strategies. For example, mainstream parties can take an accommodative strategy, but at the same time restrict RWPP institutionally. The strategy itself may influence issue salience and may determine issue ownership. At the heart of the changing nature of strategies is electoral pressure on the mainstream from niche parties, rather than institutional, sociological, or historical factors.

Table 2. Meguid' s classification of strategies

Strategies	Issue Salience	Issue Position	Issue Ownership	Meaning
Dismissive	Decreases	No movement	No effect	Signal to voters that issue lacks merit
Accommodative	Increases	Converges	Transfers to the mainstream	Adaptation of a position similar to the niche party
Adversarial	Increases	Diverges	Reinforces niche party ownership	Taking a position on a new issue that opposes the niche party position

Source: Meguid, 2008:

Tab. 3. Main approaches to mainstream parties' strategies

Strategy	Exclusion strategies	Inclusion strategies	Factors of strategy choice
Policy position approach	Holding, defusing	Adaptation	Electoral positions of RWPP + strategies of other mainstream and non-mainstream parties + internal unity
Countering extremism approach	Ignoring, political isolation, legal isolation	Cooptation, collaboration	Individual + collective + systemic factors

Issue and non-issue-based approach	Dismissive, adversarial	Accommodation	Electoral pressure from RWPP and other mainstream party
------------------------------------	-------------------------	---------------	---

Despite attempts at the theoretical understanding of mainstream's strategies (Table 3), which we use in the further analysis, the topic of *why* mainstream parties choose particular strategies is far from being investigated. When we answer the question *why*, do we need to take into account the fact that the choice of strategies is not out of time and space? And if we argue that “history matters” in strategy choice, can we trace and reveal the impulse of previously created institutions and party genesis in choosing strategies, and what tools allow us to do it?

Method and case selection

Based on the results of previous research, we combine existing classifications to define the content of UK political mainstream strategies and Heinze’s approach to determine the deciding factors of strategy choice within the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism. It seems justified that political events in a historical context have direct consequences for today’s politics (Steinmo, 2008). We specify how “history matters” in strategy selection by the analytical tools of HI: “antecedent conditions” and “critical juncture” in institutional and political development.

“Antecedent conditions” shape the choices and changes that emerge during the “critical junctures” in causally significant ways (Slater and Simmons, 2010: 887). It is important that the post-critical juncture “divergence” is driven by antecedent conditions rather than by decisions and events that take place during the “critical juncture” (Cappocia, 2016). “Critical juncture” in the theory of HI has been characterized by two main conditions: it is a choice between two or more alternatives, after which it is almost impossible to return to the point when alternatives were still available (Mahoney, 2001: 113). Actors make a choice during the “critical juncture” and these choices become part of the institutions and structures that persist for a long time (Mahoney, 2001).

We combine tools of HI with Heinze's approach to determine the deciding factors of strategy choice on the party-level. In her paper, Heinze (2018) compares the strategic reactions of the mainstream parties towards RWPP in the Nordic countries. She shows a correlation between the mainstream's gradual change from exclusion to inclusion and the complex effect of the following factors: the electoral results and the ideological development of RWPP, the

strategies of other mainstream parties, and the salience of the migration issue. Heinze's approach allows us to analyze in a complex manner reasons for the mainstream strategies' dynamics in the British case during the period 2010-2015.

This methodological approach is used to analyse the UK specific case of the interaction between the mainstream (Conservative and Labour parties) and RWPP (UKIP) as one of the most successful RWPP cases in Europe in 2010-2015. In the academic discourse, UKIP is usually defined as a right-wing populist or populist radical right party (Webb, Bale 2014; Goodwin, Milazzo 2015; Tournier-Sol 2015). More specifically, as Widfeldt and Brandenburg argued, UKIP's position in the British party system can be described as a link between the mainstream and the extreme. This makes UKIP distinctive from other British parties, a distinctiveness with parallels to the positions of anti-establishment, EU-sceptical and immigration-critical parties elsewhere in Europe (Widfeldt and Brandenburg 2017). The party's message corresponds to two features of the RWP that I have mentioned in the introduction: the dichotomy "elite-people" (the EU referendum as a battle between elites and people and attempts to speak on behalf of the "silent majority" of the British people) and nationalism/nativism expressed in the UKIP's Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant stance. Despite the fact that UKIP successfully functioned in the framework of representative democracy by participating in various levels of elections, this does not interfere with the right-wing populist party, as Taggart points out, however, at the conceptual level, it can demonstrate "antagonism to its forms and practices" (2012).

As explained in the introduction, the UK case is characterised not only by the Westminster political system, but by a strong and stable political tradition of Euroscepticism, which has become a part of mainstream politics (Bale, 2013; Watts and Bale, 2018) and shaped competition among parties. To answer the research question, we analyze policy papers and party documents, the speeches of mainstream politicians in the House of Commons and the media, and electoral statistics.

Euroscepticism as an "antecedent condition" for strategy choice in the UK case

To extend the answer to *what* and *why* the mainstream chooses, we need to analyse the role of Euroscepticism in the UK as an "antecedent condition" for strategy choice. It should be noted that Euroscepticism can proceed at various levels as a multi-level attitudinal phenomenon (Webels 2007), and political actors can promote different types of Euroscepticism (Vasilopoulou, 2009). Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) have differentiated between "hard" and

“soft” Euroscepticism. The term “hard Euroscepticism” indicates a party’s “outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining members of the EU” (Taggart & Szcerbiak 2001: 10). And “soft Euroscepticism” is defined as the qualified opposition or disagreement on one or more policy areas (Vasilopoulou, 2009).

Focusing primarily on the party dimension, we note that British Euroscepticism as “a particular manifestation of a school of sceptical thought about the value of Britain’s involvement with moves towards supranational European integration” (Forster, 2002: 2) has deep roots (but being of different degrees and reasons) in both mainstream parties. A pragmatic approach to implementing European politics leads to the presence of both Eurosceptic and Euro-optimistic segments within both main parties, although in the 1980s the political base of British Euroscepticism moved from the left to right (The Economist, 2016). The process of extending EU regulations on the labour market and social sphere led to the “crystallization” of Conservatives as the primary Eurosceptic party. In the context of the politicization of European integration after the Maastricht Treaty, which intensified in the post-Thatcherite era, Euro-optimists were almost completely supplanted from the Conservative party’s structure. Labour, under Neil Kinnock, embraced a social Europe (Helm, 2016). In the 2000s, the growing salience of the “Europe question”, due to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the Eurozone crisis (Clark et al., 2017: 113–122) became a significant problem for the British public – only 22% of British people trusted the EU (Eurobarometer, 2009). In the 2010s, it also seeded the organized “hard Euroscepticism” (UKIP), in domestic politics (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015).

Despite the fact that forms and content of British Euroscepticism, may have different characteristics in different periods of European integration, we can trace that the structural conditions expressed in the long-standing and persistent political tradition of Euroscepticism, shared in varying degrees by the elites and society, shaped UK party politics, especially in the period 2010-2015. First, if party strategies are determined not only by external dynamics (the strategies of RWPP and other mainstream parties) (Galvin, 2016: 313), but also internal ones, it is important that Euroscepticism included the presence of Eurosceptic segments in both mainstream parties. The activity of the “hard Eurosceptic” right-wing, during David Cameron’s “soft Eurosceptic” leadership was a factor which stimulated the co-opting of elements of UKIP policy. In October 2011, the largest rebellion of right-wing conservative MPs in the House of Commons occurred regarding a petition on a motion of referendum on

the country's membership in the EU. 81 Tories defied the whip in the House of Commons. Despite the impression that Labour is pro-European and Conservative anti-European, there remain some deeply sceptical Labour MPs (Aspinwall, 2003: 28). As Eurosceptic MP and member of the Labour “Leave” campaign, Kate Hoey declared, Eurosceptics are “not only in the right flank of politics” and “the Labour Party traditionally had a sceptical view of European institutions” (Hoey, 2015). Eurosceptics in the ranks of the Labour Party, who, like Jeremy Corbyn for example, voted against Britain's membership in the EEC in 1975, and voted for the motion for an EU membership referendum in October 2011 with 18 Labour rebels MP (The Guardian, 2011) were an internal stimulus to support Britain’s withdrawal from the EU in principle. It is hard to ignore that 24% of voters (or 3.1 million people), who supported Labour in 2017, voted Leave in the 2016 referendum (Ipsos Mori, 2017).

Secondly, mainstream parties paid attention to their previous experience and the idea of an EU membership referendum did not come from nothing. The possibility of playing the “referendum card” remained one of the options available to political actors in the face of increasing external and internal challenges and based on previous experience. The EEC referendum in 1975 not only solved the problem of legitimizing the UK’s joining among British people, but also overcame the inner-party opposition in the Labour camp. The idea of a referendum on rejecting further European integration was considered by the leader of the opposition, Michael Howard, in 2005 (Jones, 2004); the Lisbon Treaty Referendum announced by his successor David Cameron in 2007; Tony Blair as Prime Minister did not accept the idea of having a referendum about joining the single currency (Elliott, 1999). As William Hague, Leader of the Opposition 1997-2001 said, he was someone who called for referendums on European matters—on the Amsterdam, Nice, Lisbon Treaties and on joining the Eurozone—and consumed vast acres of newsprint over the years (Hague, 2011).

It should be noted that the Eurosceptic legacy as a “default setting” in UK party politics is not a monocausal explanation of the subsequent mainstream strategy choice. The impact of a party-based Eurosceptic tradition provided the mainstream, to a large extent, with access to the predominantly inclusion strategies at a “critical juncture”. At this moment, the mainstream gave strategic answers to RWP, which were embedded in institutions without the possibility of turning back. Despite the available alternatives, both mainstream parties moved to similar and, to a certain degree, synchronized, predominantly inclusion strategies, and, as Heinze argued, when the mainstream adopts some kind of engagement or inclusion strategy, it cannot easily be reversed (2018:303). Moreover, if choices at a “critical juncture” have

long-term legacies and reinforce themselves (the process of “path dependence”), the EU membership referendum as an implementation of UKIP policy caused not only the conceptual crisis of RWPP, but “unexpected consequences” in policy outcomes for the mainstream itself and UK’s institutional development. In the following part of the article we determine how the factors of strategy choice used by Heinze (2018) were represented in the UK case. These factors are becoming more important and have a cumulative effect on strategy choice at a “critical juncture”.

Factors for the mainstream parties’ choice of strategies

The salience of the migration issue. Despite the fact that both main political parties conspired with considerable success to avoid competing over immigration issues, “New Labor’s” migration policy and the accession of new member states to the EU, British voters became increasingly concerned about the consequences of growing immigration (McLaren and Johnson, 2007). From 1997 to 2010, the UK population increased by around 3.2 million as a direct result of foreign migrants (Whitehead, 2011). This salience of the migration issue was intensified in the context of the Eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis. As a result, Brexit and immigration were seen as the biggest issues for the British public (Ipsos Mori, 2016). It is important to note that migration in the UK British discourse that does not distinguish between those who come to the UK and have the EU citizenship, and those who come from outside the EU and so are subject to the UK immigration laws, which made it possible to link migration with Euroscepticism in the public opinion.

The public salience of the migration issue was reflected in political debate and policy development of mainstream parties. The Conservative party exploited its historical ‘ownership’ of the immigration issue as a strategic push for power (Dennison and Goodwin, 2015). Labour also shifted to the right (Bale, 2014; Carvalho, 2018). The 2014 National Policy Forum Report that contained “One Nation Labour” replacing “New Labour”, recognised that we cannot take integration for granted and the “pace of migration to the UK was too fast” (National Policy Forum Report, 2014: 69). The thesis that Labour would prioritize “stronger” border controls to tackle illegal immigration and use “smarter” targets to reduce low-skilled migration moved from the internal political debate into the Labour manifesto (Labour, 2015).

The ideological development of the UK Independence Party. UKIP was created in 1993 on the base of a cross-party Anti-Federalist League in response to the ratification of the

Maastricht Treaty. In reaction to the Eurozone crisis, Conservatives' shift to the centre under first years of David Cameron's leadership (2005-2007), and Con-Lib coalition in 2010, which created a window of opportunities for UKIP on the right flank of British politics, the party underwent an ideological evolution. UKIP made a transition from a single-issue party of "hard Euroscepticism" to populist, anti-migrant, and anti-Westminster (Bale, 2018; Ford and Goodwin, 2014). As the party's manifesto of 2010 says, "while withdrawal from the European Union political superstate is central to UKIP's message, the party has a full range of policies that have helped it grow to become Britain's fourth largest political party" (UKIP, 2010: 2). UKIP has reworked the Eurosceptic and conservative traditions into a populist narrative so as to maximize its electoral appeal (Tournier-Soul 2015). It is important that UKIP realized its attempt to "de-demonize" or present itself as a respectable political force by distancing itself from right-wing radicalism: the party's constitution bans former BNP members from joining UKIP (Hunt, 2014) and UKIP rejected an electoral pact with BNP before the European election of 2009 (BBC, 2008).

Against the backdrop of a favourable external environment, the anti-immigration orientation of UKIP became more distinct. Solving the migration issue, in the logic of UKIP, would be the result of the country's withdrawal from the EU. UKIP, in a populist manner "speaking for the silent majority" (Hall, 2014), planned to restore control over national borders and "end uncontrolled migration". The connection between UKIP and an "immigration issue" in the political debates (Partos, 2017) is important, but UKIP was not originally an anti-migrant party, its migration stance is secondary to its Eurosceptic nature. It is important to note that UKIP is "a party of English nationalism". It focuses specifically on the English electorate and, as a result, politicizes "Englishness" (Jeffrey et. al., 2016) in the party competition. A bright example is the demand of the UKIP to create an English Parliament (UKIP 2017 Manifesto).

UKIP showed the most impressive *electoral results* in the European elections: 2nd place in 2009 (15.6%) and 1st place in 2014 (26.6%). Local elections were also held in 2014, where the party showed impressive success. In the north of England, UKIP showed it could pose a threat in the traditional strongholds of the Labour party, taking 10 of the 21 council seats up for Labour-dominated council – Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council. UKIP was able to convert its growing support to the general election result in 2015. The party won 12.6% of vote and the shift from the party's result of 2010 elections was about 11 percentage points (BBC, 2015). In the 2015 General Election, UKIP came second in 120 constituencies across

the UK. Of these 120 seats, Labour MPs currently represent 44 and Conservative MPs 76 (Dempsey, 2017). Thanks to the “first-past-the-post” electoral system, however, in the House of Commons the party took only one seat, Clacton. Despite the inability to form a significant faction in the House of Commons, UKIP created pressure in terms of imposing its Eurosceptic agenda, which increased the chances of the mainstream (primarily the centre-right) moving towards inclusive strategies towards RWPP.

The party's success in European and local elections in 2014, and then in the 2015 General Elections made it clear that UKIP was a threat not only to the Conservatives, but also to the Labour Party. UKIP's performance entrenched the relationship between the party and Britain's economically left behind, working class voters (Goodwin, Milazzo 2015: 14). Like the National Rally in France, UKIP was on the road to be a ‘Proletariat party’, weakening Labour's position among this social group. As Ford wrote in a post in *The Guardian*, “UKIP surged in seats with large concentrations of poorer, white working-class English nationalists, many of whom sympathized with Labour's economic message but not the people delivering it” (Ford, 2015). UKIP was third in this socio-demographic category, receiving 19% of the votes, the Labour and Conservatives received 32% each (BBC, 2015).

The strategies of the Conservative and Labour parties. From the 1990s to the early 2000s, the electoral performance of UKIP allowed the main parties to apply an ignoring, or rather a “do nothing” strategy as the Conservatives had issue-ownership on these themes. In 2007-2009, the pressure of the right wing of the party forced the Tory leadership to move to the indirect co-optation strategy to “recapture the policy space” (Krell et al., 2018) between the Conservatives and UKIP, which had been lost in previous years of Cameron's modernization. At that time, the Labour party continued to ignore RWPP, except for sporadically using the anti-immigrant slogans of radical right BNP – “British jobs for British workers” to retain the support of low-skilled workers. The proximity of two political forces during this period, UKIP's “game” with the same ideological concepts (*references*), and the electoral vulnerability of conservatives from UKIP, are determined by the fact that conservatives are the first to move to accommodation strategy. In addition, Conservatives' transition becomes a factor that forces Labor to rethink their strategy.

After the 2010 elections, the Conservatives continue to collaborate with UKIP on EU and immigration issues. A clear example is the European Union Act 2011. After 2013, as a reaction to UKIP's electoral growth, the Conservatives turned to co-optation by using policy

elements, primarily an in/out referendum on Britain's membership of the EU on the new conditions, if the Tories won the 2015 elections. As Alexandre-Collier argued, conservative leadership purposefully swept away by absorbing their agenda. At the same time the author stated that conservatives did not really do so as the voting system made it almost impossible for UKIP to gain seats in Westminster (Alexandre-Collier 2017). I proceed from the fact that intensive transition to co-optation strategy happened because the UKIP attracted conservative deputies and voters, so an element of institutional isolation would not be enough. Thus, the course towards a Britain EU membership referendum and adoption of the Migration Acts during the Con-Lib coalition is a turn to direct accommodation or co-optation.

As for Labour, there were internal discussions in the Labour party about the UKIP problem, such as an article from the Fabian society: "UKIP doesn't just pose a problem for Labour strategically, but divides the party internally" (Roberts et al., 2014: 2). Lord Ashcroft's large-scale polling consistently indicated that 40–50% of UKIP's post-2010 gains have come from ex-Conservative voters. This is in contrast to only 15-20% from Labours' 2010 voters. As a consequence, Labour made the simple argument that UKIP takes more votes from the Tories than from Labour and therefore is a bigger problem for the Tories than for Labour.

The threat of UKIP stimulated Labour's policy development, but the party was divided in this matter. The Labour denied the necessity of an EU referendum, but also shifted to the right in the form of *informal co-optation* (the 2014 European and local elections were a "critical juncture"), which was fixed in their 2015 Election manifesto. The party promised to legislate a "lock" that guarantees no transfer of powers from Britain to the EU without an in/out referendum (Labour, 2015) and Labour Leader Ed Miliband claimed that he is against an "ever closer union" (Menon, 2014).

The Conservatives and Labour combined the cooptation or accommodation with a "sanitary cordon" around UKIP on the electoral, legislative, and executive levels to prevent the erosion of the mainstream party to RWP. Despite calling for an electoral pact between the Tories and UKIP among conservative backbenchers (BBC, 2014), the opportunity of a coalition with RWPP was consistently rejected by the Tory leadership for the reason that "UKIP wants not to work with conservatives in tandem, but to destroy the Conservative party" (Graham, 2014). A favourable factor for the "sanitary cordon" is the "first-past-the-post" electoral system, which did not allow UKIP to form a significant parliamentary faction. Both the Conservatives and Labour showed interest in preserving the election system, which suggests that it was an element of institutional isolation.

The practical realization of political strategies is more composite and variable than the theoretical classifications. The British mainstream parties chose co-opting political strategies with elements of political and legal isolation. The Conservatives used the formal co-optation of elements of UKIP policy – a referendum on the country's membership in the EU. For Labour there was informal cooptation as a “reduction of space” in policy positions between them and RWPP on European and immigration issues. Political isolation occurred in the form of non-cooperation with RWPP. Mainstream parties did not institutionalize the “sanitary cordon” in the form of a “grand coalition” as in Germany, thanks to the electoral system, which in 2015 blocked the formation of a substantial UKIP faction in the House of Commons (an element of legal isolation).

Conclusion

Expanding the answer to how and why the mainstream responds to RWP, we have confirmed the hypothesis that the mainstream parties’ transition from exclusive to predominantly inclusive strategies towards RWPP, happens under the influence of complex factors, including historical conditions. As the analysis of UK case shows, the available options for strategy choice were deeply influenced by party-Euroscepticism as “an antecedent condition”, which opened access to predominantly inclusion strategies towards RWPP during the “critical juncture” – the 2014 European and local elections. “History matters” in strategy choice, but it is not a monocausal explanation.

The UK case proved that the transition of the mainstream parties from exclusion to predominantly inclusion strategies occurred under the influence of a complex of factors: (1) in the wake of the external challenges, the migration problem became the second most important in British society, so the political mainstream made a shift to the right; (2) the ideological development of UKIP from a “single-issue hard Eurosceptic” party to a RWPP with an anti-immigrant and anti-Westminster orientation and a populist message and (3) its electoral results was one more factor in the mainstream’s strategy choice, especially for the Conservative party. Proceeding from an ideological affinity with UKIP and the position of the governing party, the Conservative Party was the first to switch to cooptation or accommodation; (4) This move had an impetus for Labour to move away from an exclusion strategy. As a result, the parties implemented similar strategies with differences in the degree of the co-optation but coordinated in the political and legal isolation of RWPP. It means that the political mainstream could combine types of strategies, synchronize, and coordinate them, depending on different factors.

Tab. 4. Conservative and Labour strategies 2004-2018 by using tools of different classifications

Period	Conservatives	Labour
2004-2007	Predominantly ignoring	Dismissive
2007-2012	Informal cooptation or accommodation + political and legal isolation	Predominantly dismissive
2013-2014	Formal cooptation or accommodation + political and legal isolation	Predominantly dismissive
Since 2014	Formal cooptation or accommodation + “sanitary cordon” + legal isolation	Formal cooptation or accommodation + “sanitary cordon” + legal isolation

To sum up, this article provides the basis for future research on how and why strategies’ choices and changes occur, and why and how strategies’ choices create certain institutional paths. The mainstream may co-opt RWPP's policy positions to neutralize their opponents (De Lange, 2012; Bale, 2018), but reacting to the antisystem, anti-elitist, and Eurosceptical nature of RWPP, the chosen political strategies have effects that carry the same threats. “Critical junctures....may uncover situations in which the institutional outcome does not reflect the preferences of any specific actor, or even falls within the “winset” of the institutional preferences of any one set of actors” (Tsebelis and Yatahanas, 2002). In this context, Brexit and the continued radicalization of the Conservative Party (Alexandre-Collier, 2016: 216) as an “unexpected consequence” was not the purpose of the strategies of any of the mainstream parties but became a side-effect of their strategies in 2010-2015.

According to this, the further development of the tools of HI in the mainstream's strategies analysis looks promising. The situation of a “critical juncture” and “path dependence” in strategy realization could answer the questions why mainstream parties choose concrete types

of strategies and why they cannot change it when they clash with “unexpected consequences”. HI also defines the role of the timing and sequence of political events while choosing and implementing strategies in different national cases.

***Sergei Shein**, Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies, National Research University “Higher School of Economics”, Malaya Ordynka Str., 17, Moscow, Russia. E-mail: sshein@hse.ru ORCID ID: 0000-0001-9749-9116

References

Alexandre-Collier A (2018) From soft to hard Brexit: UKIP's not so invisible influence on the Eurosceptic radicalisation of the Conservative Party since 2015. In: Herman LE and Muldoon J (eds) *Trumping the Mainstream: The Conquest of Democratic Politics by the Populist Radical Right*. London: Routledge, pp. 204–221.

Art D (2006) Reacting to The Radical Right. Lessons from Germany and Austria. *Party Politics* 13 (3): 331–349.

Arzheimer K (2015) The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany? *West European Politics* 38 (3): 535–556.

Aspinwall M (2003) *Understanding British MP Attitudes to European Integration*. London: EI Working Paper.

Bale T (2003) Cinderella and Her Ugly Sisters: The Mainstream and Extreme Right in Europe's Bipolarizing Party Systems. *West European Politics* 26 (3): 67–90.

Bale T, Green-Pedersen C, Krouwel A, Richard Luther K, Sitter N (2010) If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe. *Political Studies* 58 (3): 410–426.

Bale T (2014) Putting it Right? The Labour Party's Big Shift on Immigration since 2010. *The Political Quarterly* 85(3): 296–303.

Bale T (2013) More and more restrictive—But not always populist: Explaining variation in the British Conservative Party's stance on immigration and asylum. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 21: 25–37.

Bale T (2018) ‘Who leads and who follows?’ The symbiotic relationship between UKIP and the Conservatives – and populism and Euroscepticism. *Politics* 38 (3): 263–277.

BBC (2015) Election 2015. *BBC News*, 8 May. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2015> (accessed 10 September 2019).

BBC (2008) UKIP rejects BNP electoral offer. *BBC News*, 3 November. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7706857.stm (accessed 04.04.2019).

BBC (2014) Tory MP Jacob Rees-Mogg calls for Conservative/UKIP pact. *BBC News*, 3 May. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-somerset-22419219> (accessed 10 April 2019).

Best H, Lengyel G, Verzichelli, L (eds) (2012) *The Europe of Elites: A Study into the Europeanness of Europe's Political and Economic Elites*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cappocia J (2016) Critical Junctures. In: Fioretos O, Falleti T, Sheingate A (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 2–20.

Cappocia J (2001) Defending democracy: Reactions to Political Extremism in Inter-War Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* 39: 431–460.

Carvalho J (2017) Mainstream Party Strategies Towards Extreme Right Parties: The French 2007 and 2012 Presidential Elections. *Government and Opposition*: 1-22.

Carvalho J, Ruedin D (2018) The positions mainstream left parties adopt on immigration: A cross-cutting cleavage? *Party Politics*: 1–11.

Clarke HD, Goodwin M, Whiteley P (2017) *Brexit. Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union?* Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

De Lange S (2012) New Alliances: Why Mainstream Parties Govern with Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties. *Political Studies*, 60 (4): 899–918.

Dempsey N (2017) Marginal seats. *Briefing Paper House of Commons Library*. Number CBP 8067, 10 August. Available at: <https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-8067#fullreport> (accessed 10 September 2019).

Dennison J and Goodwin M (2015) Immigration, Issue Ownership and the Rise of UKIP. *Parliamentary affairs* 68 (1): 168–187.

Downs W (2012) *Political Extremism in Democracies: Combating Intolerance*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Downs W (2001) Pariahs in Their Midst: Belgian and Norwegian Parties React to extremist threats. *West European Politics* 34 (3): 23–42.

Elliot L (1999) Blair delivers blow to euro, *The Guardian* [online] 21 June. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/business/1999/jun/21/emu.theeuro> (accessed 10 September 2019).

Eurobarometer 71 (2009) Public Opinion in the European Union. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/yearFrom/1973/yearTo/2009/surveyKy/829> (accessed 10 September 2019).

Fallend F and Heinisch R (2016) Collaboration as Successful Strategy Against Right-wing Populism? The Case of the Centre-right Coalition in Austria, 2000–2007. *Democratization* 23 (2): 324–344.

Feldman D (2014) Why immigration policy since 1962 has such a poor record of achievement, *Blog LSE*, 24 November. Available at: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/talking-the-talk-immigration-policy-since-1962/> (accessed 10 April 2019).

Ford R and Goodwin M (2014) Understanding UKIP: Identity, Social Change and the Left Behind. *The Political Quarterly* 85 (3): 277–284.

Ford R (2015) Where the Votes Switched – and Why: The Key Lessons for the Parties. *The Guardian* [online] 10 May. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/10/election-2015-where-the-votes-switched-and-why> (accessed 10 April 2019).

Forster A (2002) *Euro scepticism in Contemporary British Politics: Opposition to Europe in the British Conservative and Labour Parties Since 1945*. London: Routledge.

Galston W (2018) *Anti-Pluralism: The Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy (Politics and Culture)*. Yale University Press.

Galvin DJ (2016) Political Parties in American Politics. In: Fioretos O, Falletti T, Sheingate A (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 310–324.

Goodwin M and Milazzo C (2015) Britain, the European Union and the Referendum: What Drives Euro scepticism? *Chatham House*. Available at:

<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/20151209EuroscepticismGoodwinMilazzo.pdf> (accessed 10 April 2019).

Goodwin M (2016) Right Response. Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe. *Chatham House Report*. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/r0911_goodwin.pdf (accessed 10 April 2019).

Graham G (2014) David Cameron: Nigel Farage wants to 'destroy' the Conservatives. *The Telegraph* [online] 26 May. Available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/10856133/David-Cameron-Nigel-Farage-wants-to-destroy-the-Conservatives.html> (accessed 10 April 2019).

Greven T (2016) The Rise of Right-wing Populism in Europe and the United States. A Comparative Perspective. *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*. Available at: https://www.fesdc.org/fileadmin/user_upload/publications/RightwingPopulism.pdf (accessed 10 April 2019).

Guia A (2016) The Concept of Nativism and Anti-Immigrant Sentiments in Europe. *EUI Working papers*. Available at: http://www.mwpweb.eu/1/218/resources/news_970_1.pdf (accessed 10 April 2019).

Hall M (2014) Ukip: We'll Speak up for Silent Majority. *Express* [online] 1 March. Available at: <https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/462471/Ukip-We-ll-speak-up-for-silent-majority-in-Euro-elections> (accessed 10 April 2019).

Hague W (2011) Speech: House of Commons Debates. 24 October, col. 55.

Helm T (2016) British Euroscepticism: a brief history. *The Guardian*, 7 February. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/07/british-euroscepticism-a-brief-history> (accessed 10 April 2019).

Heinze AS (2018) Strategies of Mainstream Parties towards their Right-wing Populist Challengers: Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland in Comparison. *West European Politics* 42 (2): 287–309.

Hoey K (2015) Labour MP Kate Hoey: Why leaving the EU is a left-wing move. *The Independent* [online] 9 October. Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/labour->

[mp-kate-hoey-why-leaving-the-eu-is-a-left-wing-move-a6687936.html](https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21614073) (accessed 10 April 2019).

Hunt A (2014) The Story of UK Independence Rise. *BBC News* [online] 21 November. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21614073> (accessed 10 April 2019).

Kneuer M (2018) The Tandem of Populism and Euroscepticism: a Comparative Perspective in The Light of The European Crises. *Contemporary Social Science* 14 (1): 26-42. DOI: 10.1080/21582041.2018.1426874

Ipsos Mori (2015) How Britain Voted in 2015. The 2015 Election – Who Voted for Whom. Available at: <https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3575/How-Britain-voted-in-2015.aspx?view=wide> (accessed 10 September 2019).

Ipsos Mori (2017) How Britain voted in the 2017 election. Available at: https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/how-britain-voted-2017-election?language_content_entity=en-uk (accessed 10 September 2019).

Ipsos Mori (2016) Immigration and NHS tied as the most important issues facing Britain, 4 November. Available at: <https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/immigration-and-nhs-tied-most-important-issues-facing-britain> (accessed 10 September 2019).

Jones G (2004) Howard counters UKIP with EU pledge. *The Telegraph* [online] 2 October. Available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1473158/Howard-counters-UKIP-with-EU-pledge.html> (accessed 10 April 2019).

Krell C, Mollers H, Ferch N (eds) (2018) Reclaiming Action – Progressive Strategies in Times of Growing Right-Wing Populism in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Germany, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Nordic Countries.

Labour Party Manifesto 2015. Available at: <https://action.labour.org.uk/page/-/A4%20BIG%20PRINT%20ENG%20LABOUR%20MANIFESTO%20TEXT%20LAYOUT.pdf> (accessed 10 April 2019).

Lyons J (2006) Ukip are Closet Racists, Says Cameron. *The Independent* [online] 4 April. Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/ukip-are-closet-racists-says-cameron-6104699.html> (accessed 10 September 2019).

Mahoney J (2001) Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36 (1): 111-141.

March L (2017) Left and Right Populism Compared: The British case. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19 (2): 282–303.

Menon A (2014) Miliband is fully committed to ever closer union. *Center for Policy Studies*. Available at: <https://www.cps.org.uk/blog/q/date/2014/03/12/miliband-is-fully-committed-to-ever-closer-union/> (date of access 10 September 2019)

McLaren L and Johnson M (2007) Resources, Group Conflict and Symbols: Explaining Anti-Immigration Hostility in Britain. *Political Studies* 55 (4): 709-732.

Meguid B (2008) *Party competition between unequals: Strategies and electoral fortunes in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mudde C and Kaltwasser RC (2012) *Populism in Europe and the Americas. Threat or corrective to democracy?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mudde C (2007) *The Populist Radical Right in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mudde C (2004) ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’. *Government and Opposition* 39 (4): 542–563.

Muller J (2016) *What is Populism?* University of Pennsylvania Press.

National Referendum on the United Kingdom's Membership of the European Union. Division number 372 – in the House of Commons on 24 October 2011. *TheyWorkForYou*. Available at: <https://www.theyworkforyou.com/divisions/pw-2011-10-24-372-commons/mp/10133> ((accessed 10 September 2019).

Painter A (2013) *Democratic Stress, the Populist Signal and Extremist Threat: A Call for a New Mainstream Statecraft and Contact Democracy*. London: Policy Network.

Partos R (2017) The European mainstream and the populist radical right: The British case. *The European Mainstream and the Populist Radical Right*. Eds. by Odmalm P, Hepburn E. Routledge. Pp. 28-48.

Pierro A, Kessel S, Taggart P (2018) The Populist Politics of Euroscepticism in Times of Crisis: Comparative conclusions. *Politics* 38 (3): 1–13.

Roberts M, Ford R, Warren I (2014) Revolt on the left. Labour's UKIP problem and how it can be overcome. *Fabian Society*. Available at: <http://www.fabians.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/RevoltOnTheLeft-Final4.pdf> (accessed 10 September 2019).

Rothwell J (2017) How Marine Le Pen transformed the Front National into a party for the populist era. *The Telegraph* [online] 30 January. Available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/30/marine-le-pen-transformed-front-national-party-populist-era/> (accessed 10 September 2019).

Rydgren J (2007) The Sociology of the Radical Right. *Annual Review of Sociology* 33: 241–62.

Slater D and Simmons E (2010) Informative Regress: Critical Antecedents in Comparative Politics. *Comparative Political Studies* 43 (7): 886-917.

Stability and Prosperity. National Policy Forum Report (2014). Available at: https://www.policyforum.labour.org.uk/uploads/editor/files/NPF_Annual_Report_2014.pdf (accessed 10 September 2019).

Steinmo S (2008) Historical Institutionalism. *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences*. Porta, D D, M. Keating, M (eds). Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

Szöcsik E and Polyakova A (2018) Euroscepticism and The Electoral Success of the Far Right: The Role of the Strategic Interaction Between Center and Far Right. *European political science*: 1–21.

Taggart P (2012) Populism has the potential to damage European democracy, but demonising populist parties is self-defeating. *Blog LSE*. Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/49452/1/__Libfile_repository_Content_LSE%20EUROPP_2012_December%202012_Week%203_blogs.lse.ac.uk-Populism_has_the_potential_to_damage_European_democracy_but_demonising_populist_parties_is_selfdefeat.pdf (accessed 31 January 2019).

Thatcher M *Speech to the College of Europe ("The Bruges Speech")*. Available at: <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332> (accessed 10 April 2019).

The Economist (2016) The Roots of Euroscepticism [online], 12 March. Available at: <https://www.economist.com/britain/2016/03/12/the-roots-of-euroscepticism> (accessed 10 April 2019).

The Guardian (2011) David Cameron rocked by record rebellion as Europe splits Tories again. 25 October. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/oct/24/david-cameron-tory-rebellion-europe> (accessed 10 April 2022).

Tsebelis A and Yatağan X (2002) Veto Players and Decision-making in the EU After Nice. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40 (2): 283–307.

UKIP (2010) *UKIP Manifesto April 2010: Empowering the People*. Newton Abbot: UKIP.

Vasilopoulou S (2018) *Far Right Parties and Euroscepticism: Patterns of Opposition*. London: Rowman & Littlefield International.

Watts J and Bale T (2018) Populism as an intra-party phenomenon: The British Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 21 (1): 99–115.

Widfeldt A and Brandenburg H (2017) What Kind of Party Is the UK Independence Party? The Future of the Extreme Right in Britain or Just Another Tory Party? *Political Studies* 66 (3): 577–660.

Whitehead T (2011) More than three million migrants under Labour. *The Telegraph* [online], 22 January. Available at: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/8339075/More-than-three-million-migrants-under-Labour.html> (accessed 28.03.2019).

Wodak R, KhosraviNik M, Mral B (eds) (2013) *Right-Wing Populism in Europe Politics and Discourse*. Bloomsbury Academic.